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The General Right of the Orderer to Rescind „at any Time" 
Delivery Contracts, as Well as Contracts for Work, 
Labour and Materials of Economic Units 
The charactersitic transactions of a society building up socialism are 
contracts effectuating the turnover of production, as well as those of enter-
prising type, having an important role in creating the conditions of 
reproduction on an increasing scale. Just therefore, these cannot be left out 
of consideration at investigating into dogmatic questions. The process of 
differentiation, which presents itself, even if sometimes with some inter-
ruptions, has similarly some importance. Here I think of that in a socialist 
society not only the contracts concerning the work of performation have 
some distinguishing marks but — in the scope of financial contracts — the 
mutual connections of economic organizations, the inner contractual con-
nections of large units, the contracts between nationals and economic units, 
as well. Closest to the classical contractual connections are the mutual 
contracts of nationals, though these are, too, under the effect of the typically 
socialist legal principles, contractual principles, and the circumstance that 
the economic media, in which they are açtive, has changed. 
In the mutual transactions of economic units — be those turnover 
investment — the conclusion of contracts is therefore so important because 
this is one of the guranatees and means of realizing the production, in fact, 
in the interest of a definite aim. The end of a treaty is to be implemented. 
I.e., for the jurist, the point of view of requirements concerning the 
implementation of the contract is reversed. While the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, established in the bourgeois society, is therefore to be followed 
according to the jurist because the agreement was concluded, in the 
centralized stage of building socialism — where the so-called "Soviet model" 
of economic direction is prevailing — it is just the other way round, the 
contract is to be concluded in order to be followed, strictly, together with 
all its conditions as prescribed in the contract. It is presumable that the 
interest of contract — coinciding with the interest of people's economy — 
is contained by the plan. Therefore, thé interest of jurisprudence and legal 
practice is reduced by a level, namely to the level of ensuring the imple-
mentation corresponding to the contract, and not the investigation correspond-
ing to the contract, and not the investigation into actions, corresponding to 
the interests. From the point of view of legal dogmatics, among others also 
the requirement, raised in respect of the seriousness of declarations in the 
contract, helps establish the stricter legal opinions concerning implementa-
tion. In this way we have got so far that, e.g. our Act II of 1959 raises 
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identical requirements in respect of implementing the contract, whosever the 
contracting partner may be. The same principles are expressed in the system 
of sanctions, as well. The motive for the latter one was, too,1 to enforce that 
conduct, corresponding to the given contract, and to make alone possible the 
liquidation of the legal relation if there was no other solution (cf., e.g. delay, 
faulty performance). And even, the general and special rules of the possible 
cancellation of an agreement not of sanctioned character are very strict. 
In the scope of the contracts of economic units (plan-contracts) there is 
essentially no opportunity to any cancellation. The change in the plan-task 
is similarly a necessarily mechanical way of looking concerning implemen-
tation, based upon the economic arrangements, resp. it only enables the 
revision of the contract in its part not touching the plan. 
Owing to those told above, according to the opinion prevailing in the 
socialist legal literature, the principle of the so-called real implementation has 
essentially been recognized as in the basic principle of the civil law of socialist 
legal systems the "ius in personam". Since its formation, it has however 
been — in several relations2 — not unambiguous. 
Tho following major controversial questions are to be found: 
1. what is the content of this principle?3 
2. how wide is its effect within the civil law?4 (is it the basic principle 
1 Gyula Eörsi sees also in his article "A reális teljesítés elve a gazdaságirá-
nyítás új rendszerében" (The principle of real fulfilment in the new system of 
economic direction) the cause of that Civil Code extended the principle of real 
fulfilment to the contracts of nationals in the requirement realized in respect of 
the seriousness of declaration. Cf.: Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1968. Nos. 7-8, p. 342. 
2 I would mention as examples only a few works from the part of the 
Hungarian legal literature falling to this period: György Aczél: A szállítási szer-
ződések (Delivery contracts). Budapest, 1952, Jogi és Államigazgatási Könyv- és 
Folyóirat Kiadó, pp. 35-39. Gyula Eörsi: A szocialista polgári jog alapproblémái 
(Basic problems of the socialist civil law). Budapest, 1965. Akadémiai Kiadó, pp. 
71, 76, 80. Idem: A tervszerződések (Plan-contracts), 1957. Akadémiai Kiadó, pp. 
379-408. László Fülöp: A szállítási szerződési rendszer új szabályozása (New 
regulation of the system of delivery contracts). Döntőbíráskodás, 1966, No. 3, 
Mihály Görgey: Kellékszavatosság a szállítási szerződések körében (Warranty of 
specified quality in the scope of delivery contracts) Budapest, 1965. Közgazdasági 
és Jogi Könyvkiadó, pp. 142, 169, 182. 
3 We find in the work of I.B. Novicky and L.A. Lunc: Obsee utchenie ob 
obyazatelstv (Moscow, 1950. Gosyurisdat) that the principle of the real fulfilment 
means the suitable implementation of the content of obligation (pp. 270-291). V.K. 
Raj her opposes the enlargement of the principle of real fulfilment in such a high 
degree. Cf.: Legal questions of the contractual discipline (in Russian), Leningrad. 
Izdatelstvo. Universiteta, 1958. Official Hungarian translation, pp. 27-29. (Institute 
of Political and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Sz. 1210) 
In respect of its first early domestic exposition in the legal literature Cf.: György 
Aczél: Ip. cit. pp. 35-39, where he strongly emphasizes the role of this principle 
in the fulfilment of the Plan and it follows of this, of course, that he considers 
the requirement of the fulfilment in natura as similarly important as the suitable 
fulfilment of the contractual stipulations. Similarly Béla Kemenes: A reális telje-
sítés, valamint a kötbér és kártérítés viszonyának kérdése polgári jogunkban (The 
question of the real fulfilment as well as of the relation between the penalty for 
non-performance, and the remuneration for injury suffered, in our civil law. Jogi 
Dolgozatok, Szeged, 1954 (Manuscript). 
4 Endre Nizsalovszky considers it — it seems to me — as the basic principle 
of the whole civil law. One is sure that, according to him, it is decisive to 
nationals in the same way as to the socialist economic units. Cf.: Az állami válla-
latok forgalmi viszonyainak új alakulásához (On the new development of the 
turnover relations of national enterprisés. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1968, vol. XI. 
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of the whole branch of law or only of ius in personam or possibly only of 
economic contracts) 
3. in what extent does it determine the actions, free will of parties?5 
4. on the basis of what criteria can be established, whether this is 
really a basic principle?6 
5. is this really a basic principle?7 
6. what is its role in the socialist economy?8 
No. 4, p. 335. Miklós Világhy enumerates it among the basic principles of the 
civil law, although he emphasizes that it is most characteristic of the legal 
relations based on the contract. As he says, it expresses the principle of contractual 
trustworthiness, In contradistinction to the standpoint, prevailing in the Hungarian 
legal literature, he sees its general phrasing in art. 198 of Civil Code, according 
to which: "From the contract an obligation results to fulfil the delivery, and an 
entitlement to require the delivery." Cf. the book of Miklós Világhy—Gyula Eörsi: 
Magyar polgári jog (Hungarian civil law.) Vol. 1. General Part. Ownership. 3rd 
unchanged reprint. Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest, 1973. pp. 28, 33. Gyula Eörsi 
considers it in his work: összehasonlító jog. Jogtípusok, jogcsoportok és a jog-
fejlődés útjai (Comparative civil law. Law types, law groups and the ways of the 
development of law), Budapest, Akadémiái Kiadó, 1975, p. 313, as only the basic 
principle of the fulfilment of the plan-obliged economic units. A similar conclusion 
is to be found in V.V. Laptev's paper: Hogyaystvennoe pravo. Yuriditcheskaya 
Literatura. Moscow, 1967, pp. 146-147. establishes, too, that this principle is in 
contrast with the nature of the legal relations between nationals. László Asztalos 
does not even mention it among the basic principles of civil law, in his lecture 
notes, entitled: Polgári jog I. Általános rész II. Személyek (Civil law I. General 
part II. Persons), p. 35. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982. On the other hand, Lajos 
Tamás regards it as the basic principle of civil law, more closely of the contract 
law, in his lecture notes entitled: Magyar polgári jog. Általános rész (Hungarian 
civil law. General part). And he sees its normative expression in art. 198, sec. 1, 
as well as art. 277, sec. 1, of Civil Code. (Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1981). E. 
Warkallo considers it as the basic principle of the whole law of obligations (iura 
in personam), emphasizing that it includes both the obligations ex contractu and 
those es delicto, may these have been concluded between nationals or between 
socialist economic units: Ogolne Zasadi wikonowania zobowiazan. Studia 
Prawnicze 1973, N. 37, pp. 41-61. V.K. Rajher holds it as the basic principle of 
contracts, whether we speak of transaction of socialist organizations or of those 
- between a socialist organization and a national or of transactions between 
nationals, although he remarks that if a national is obliged, we should proceed 
very carefully and attentively, taking into consideration the principle of personal 
liberty which also follows from the Soviet law (cf.: Op.cit, pp. 59-60). S.N. Bratus 
also deals in his work: Subject and system of the Soviet civil law (in Hungarian, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1964, pp. 138-146) with the basic 
principles of civil law but here he does not enumerate the principle of real 
fulfilment. It is true that he admits that his enumeration is probably defective 
ánd complains that the Soviet legal literature has so far not dealt recollectedly 
enough with the basic principles of civil law. In a later paper, however, he 
recognizes it as a principle of the ius in personam (law of obligations) in the 
strict sense of the word: K desyatiletiyu Osnov grazhdanskogo zakonodatelstva 
soyuza CCCR i soyuznykh respublik Pravovedenie (1971, No. 6, p. 16). 
s Béle Kemenes: A szerződések szabályozásának elvi kérdései a Polgári Tör-
vénykönyvben (Questions of principle of the regulation of contracts in Civil Code), 
Acta Universitatis Szegediensis Acta Juridica l Politica, Tomus VIII, Fasciculus" 2, 
Szeged, 1961, pp. 62-63. And cf. with the works enumerated in the previous note. 
6 Cf. with the works mentioned in notes Nos. 4 and 5. 
7 ibidem. 
s H. Hutschenreuter: Das Prinzip der realen Erfüllung und sein Platz bei der 
Lösung der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftspolitischen Aufgaben. Staat un Recht. 1976. 
No. 1, pp. 63-73. I. Herrnberger—H. Langer: Zur Weiterentwichlung des Verhält-
nisses von realer Plan- und Vertragserfüllung. Staat und Recht, 1975, No. 7, pp. 
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7. what is the effect of the kinds of economic direction?9 
In order to prove the many-sidedness of interpreting this concept, I am 
referring to V.S. Tolstoy who writes in his book, edited in 1973: we could 
hardly find two works, determining the essence of this principle in the same 
way.10 
We find a similar statement in a paper of V.V. Laptev, as well, who 
says about the principles concerning implementing obligations that these have 
no generally accepted list and no uniform interpretation of their content, 
either.11 
Whaterver opinion the authors of the socialist special literature had about 
the above-mentioned basic principle, they represented a uniform standpoint 
therein that the contracts in natura, apart from a strict exception. As a 
principle, its version, named by us as the principle of adequate implement-
ation,12 lived mostly in common knowledge or it was, at least, considered as 
an obligation to be fulfilled in natura. As a result of the economic reform, 
more and more words were spoken about, in which form this principle may 
get acceptance in an economy, functioning indirectly, i.e. by using the 
elements of market mechanism! 
In the Polish literature, the principle clausula rebus sic stantibus is 
wanted as a help. It is though that a modernized variant of this would be 
1020-1030. Such: Rechtliche Mothoden zur Sicherung des Abschlusses realer Plan-
verträge. In: Aktuelle des Vertragssystems. Berlin, 1957. VEB Deutscher Zentral-
verlag, pp. 7-31. G. Pflicke: Materielle Interessiertheit und materielle Verantwort-
lichkeit. Vertragssystem, 1957, No. 2. pp. Iff. Materielle Interessiertheit und San-
tionen. Vertragssystem, 1957. No. 3., Die Bedeutung des sozialistischen Bewußtseins 
und der materiellen Interessiertheit bei der Bekämpfung von Vertragsverletzungen. 
Vertragssystem, 1960, No. 6. %. Panzer and L. Penig: Vertragsesetze und Wirt-
schaftsrecht. Staat un Recht, 1966. No. 4 pp. 603, Points 3,4,7. H. Such: Der 
Liefervertrag. Berlin, 1967. Staatsverlag der DDR. pp. 329ff. I. Spitzner: Wirtschafts-
leitung. Berlin, 1965, pp. 221. 
9 With the question, similarly more than one work dealt. We mention two of 
these as examples. Thus: Gyula Eörsi: A gazdaságirányítás új rendszere áttérés 
jogágról- (On the right of passing over to the new system of economic direction), 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 1968. p. 223., V.V. Laptev: Op.cit. 
(Hozyaysvennoe pravo, etc.), pp. 146-148. He establishes that the methods of the 
order of economic direction and of planning have effect on the way of meeting 
our liabilities, i.e. on the content of the real fulfilment, as well. It is better, to 
name tha basic principle of fulfilment, which was formed as a result of the 
10 V.S. Tolstoy: Ispolnenie obyazatelst. Moscow, 1973. Yuriditscheskaya Litera-
tura. Chap. II, pp. 46-47. N.I. Krasnov: Realnoe ispolnenie dogovornykh obyazatelstv. 
Yuriditcheskoy Literatury. Moscow, 1959, pp. 12-55. He paints a similarly coloured 
picture. 
central, direct economic direction and obliges the parties bilaterally, the principle 
of adequate fulfilment and, the same time, not to consider it as a basic principle 
of civil iaw. Cf.: Tóthné Eszter Fábián: A szerződés teljesítésének alapkérdései 
a szocialista gazdaságirányítási rendszerekben (Basic principles of fulfilling the 
contracts in the system of the socialist economic direction (Manuscript). Szeged, 
1982, p. 135. 
11 V.V. Latev: Op. cit. pp. 145-146. In the Hungarian legal literature, it is 
earlier, uniformly enough, meant by this the fulfilment, corresponding to the 
contract, which obliges both parties in the same way, although it was also 
mentioned, in a stricter sense, as a requirement of the fulfilment in natura. As to 
the domestic connections, I would only mention two characteristic examples: Gyula 
Eörsi: A tervszerződések (Plancöntracts). Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1957, p. 381. 
Mihály Görgey: Kellékszavatosság a szállítási szerződések körében (Warranty of 
specified quality in the scope of delivery contracts). Budapest, 1965. Közgazdasági 
és Jogi Könyvkiadó, pp. 173-175. 
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suitable „for solving the contractual severity of nationalized economic units. 
A detailed paper is published by P. Bubienska on this question. He criticizes 
N Dawidowicz who directly says that in social turnover the contracts are 
concluded, as a matter of fact, with a tacit clause "rebus sic stantibus" 
because we have to reckon on the emergence of some new unforeseen needs. 
A.Stelmakhowski similarly thinks to discover the presence of the mentioned 
clause in the rules — in case of changed economic conditions — which 
permit to cancel the contract. S.Buczkowski also speaks of the presence of 
the clause in certain cases of cancellation. As F. Bubienska establishes that the 
practice of the arbitration committee only accepts the possibilities enumerated 
in the rule *of law concerning modifying, cancelling or rescinding the contract, 
and assumes a negative standpoint as to the stipulations "endangering" the 
contract. It is his opinion that this traditional clause may be present in Code 
Civil and in other rules of law in a rudimentary form, but in case of the 
turnover of socialized units we should find other means which — in case of 
changed conditions — may substitute the "clause" with success, corresponding 
better to the aims of socialist economy. 
J.Trojanek, writing on the real implementation, expressly emphasizes that 
this is no principle destined for its own end. There may occur some conditions 
under which — in the time of implementation — it is not only more 
advisable to insist on the real implementation of the obligation but it may 
be direct harmful. The assertion of contracts under changed conditions comes 
into collision in the majority of cases, both with the interests of the mutually 
co-operating units and with the general interests of people's economy. He 
refers to the Soviet Z.M. Zamengof who, similarly, represented a comparable 
standpoint.13 
It is to be noted that in the Soviet Union — as a result of the economic 
reform, introduced continually in the spirit of gradualness — there is a debate 
in literature not only about modifying, cancelling the already existing 
contracts but — as the system of allocations can only slowly be liquidated — 
the right of giving up the wares, productions seeming to be superfluous for 
the future customers already before concluding the contract is more and 
more definite and elaborated towards the allocationg organ. It is interesting 
that, for instance, in case of the wares of technical-technological destination, 
the allocation can be cancelled on the basis of any consideration, while in 
case of the articles of public consumption is only possible in respect of the 
part becoming superfluous or unnecessary. A detailed paper in the scope of 
this subject is to befound in J.A. Katkova's work.14 
It is to be established from those said until now that a very important 
value of the economy of the socialist society is the satisfaction of the real 
12 Tóthné Eszter Fábián: The legal and economic basic problems of contracts, 
in the mirror of the systems of economic direction. Thesis for obtaining a 
candidate's degree. Szeged, 1978 (Manuscript), pp. 102-10%. 
13 P. Bubienska: Wplyw zmiany stosunkov na inovwy dostawy i sprzedazy 
miedzy jednostkami gospodarki Uspolecznionej. Studia Prawnicze, 1972. No. 32, pp. 
111-145., J. Trojanek: Zasada realnego wyko nania umow gospodaczych Przeglad 
Ustawodawstwa Gosoparczego. 1968, Nos. 8-9, pp. 286-261. Z.M. Zamengof: Izmeneie 
i rastorzhenie hozyaystvennykh dogovorov. Mojow, 1967. Yuriditcheskaya Literatura. 
14 E.A. Katkova: O prave pokupatelya na otkaz ot ot produkcii, izlisnikh ili 
nenuzhnykh tovarov pri zajlyutcheni dogovora postavki. "Aktualnye problemy 
grazhdanskogo prava i protsessa," pp. 23-37. Irkutski A.A. Zhdanov State 
University. Publications. Vol. 79, Legal series 11, part 3, Irkutsk, 1972. 
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needs of producers and consumers, taking into consideration the laws of 
economics, so that no superfluous production may take place and no unusable 
goods be produced. This would, namely, induce particularly much damage, 
needing manpower, raw material, store, money, fuel etc. 
The Hungarian legal regulation wants to prevent all these in the domain 
of contracts in a very radical way by having ensured to the orderer the so-
called right or rescinding the contract "at any time" at the two most important 
agreements of people's economy. 
This right is due to the orderer even in case of the goods in respect of 
which the transporter was burdened by the duty of concluding a contract. 
Otherwise, this is justified because the duty of concluding a contract burdens 
the transporters in respect of the products which are the most needed from 
the point of view of people's economy; in concreto, of course, only if it is 
asked for by the orderers. In spite of their ordering, it is still more favourable 
if the production is terminated in the course of processing than if the finished 
product becomes finally a frozen main stock. This right of the orderer to 
rescind the contract is, according to the rule of law, incompatible with the 
system of plan-instruction —^when the demands were generally and finally 
established by the plan — but it is very useful in case of indirect direction, 
particularly if it is possible to harmonize — with the help of economic 
incentives and other means — the interests of enterprises with the all-social 
interests.15 This right of challenge helps the allignment with the changing 
needs. "Own" claims of the orderer can change, as well, and also those of the 
person, in whose interest he is active. E.g. if this, as a result of innovation, 
invention, can realize his production in the way, too. that be has set aside 
one or another contract concluded in the interest of that or if his orderers 
do not claim, any more, one of his products, resp. if there is no more any 
call for that article. 
On the basis of all these, we think that, in the relation of the solution 
of the Hungarian positive law, it is superfluous to refer to the clause rebus 
sic stantibus because the orderer (vendee) is not obliged to certify any 
condition, or justify before any instance, why he sets aside a contract. There 
is only a single limit of terminating a contract carelessly, which is, however, 
sufficient to retain somebody from doing this, namely: the reparation in full. 
It is unquestionable that in the background of this right of rescission 
(terminating a contract) there is, among others, the possibility that in the 
period from concluding the contract till implementing it, the conditions may 
have changed. This, however is not good for both parties, and is not even 
for the good of the obligor — as mostly in the classical variant of the clause 
rebus sic stantibus — but exclusively for the good of the orderer (vendee), 
and not only because, taking into consideration the relation of the two parties 
or generally their economic situations, he would have been slighted but for 
the simple reason that this was his interest and, therefore, supposedly also 
that of people's economy. The protection of the obligor can, of course, not be 
neglected, either, because he may already have been active in the interest of 
is It is considered as standing in the service of satisfying the needs better, e.g. 
by Lajos Besenyei: A szocialista szervezetek közötti termékforgalmi szerződések 
szankciós rendszere, különös tekintettel a szállítási szerződésekre (System oí 
sanctions of the turnover of production contracts between socialist organizations, 
with special regard to delivery contracts. Thesis for obtaining a candidate's degree, 
1974. Szeged (Manuscript), p. 160. 
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implementation, bona fide. Thus, the burden of rescission cannot devolve on 
him. 
This right of rescission cannot be compared to the théorie de l'imprévision, 
formed in the practice of the French Conseil d'Etat and applied in exceptional 
situations, nor to the rules of law, giving an exemption to the parties in large 
numbers from the compelling force of private-law contracts, or to the English 
frustration resp. the German Wegfall der Geschàftsgrundlage.16 These have 
developed as a result of the mass aggravation of obligtions. Though, it is true, 
these were applied exceptionally after the passing of wars, catastrophic crises, 
as well, because there may occur — even without the mentioned situations — 
some changes, not seen at concluding the contracts, affecting a large number 
of persons, in case of which the contract cannot remain valid. It is 
characteristic of these legal institutions that they render legal assistance to one 
or the other party only by conducting judicial proceedings, in order to relieve 
him from the contract — as, e.g. according to the Hungarian private law, as 
well, prior to the Civil Code17 — or to modifying the contract. The weaker 
party, who got into an economically difficult situation, mostly the obliged one, 
is protected. 
In case of the Hungarian solution, we cannot speak of the above-
mentioned characteristics. This institution, as mentioned, serves thoroughly 
different aims. Its formation did not go smoothly. Its practical application 
gives, in case of a debate, therefore trouble to legal courts because the aim of 
the rules concerning the violation of a contract is invariably to enforce the 
conduct corresponding to the contract. They authorize to oblige primarily 
to this. 
The right to have a contract judicially set aside by one of the parties "at 
any time," named "rescission" by the maker of law, is such a "forming" law18, 
by the practice of which a contract may be terminated unilaterally, possibly 
restoring the original state in order to prevent some major damage or loss. 
It follows from the general rules of Civil Code concerning rescission that 
this institution cannot be effective without any limit. According to Art. 320, 
sec. 1 of Civil Code,19 rescission can be founded upon -a contract or a rule 
of the law. 
The rights of rescission, founded on the rule of a law, may generally be 
classified into two categories: 
Under one of the categories fall the cases in which the authorized party 
resiles from the contract owing to the breach of it by the other party. In 
is Gyula, Eörsi: összehasonlító polgári jog stb. (Comparative civil law etc.) 
pp. 247-250. Attila Harmathy: Változások a szerződések burzsoá elméletében 
(Changes in the bourgeois theory of contracts.) Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1974, vol. 
XVII/4. Cf. particularly with pp. 606-608. 
17 Frigyes, Görög: A kötelem ügyleti megszüntetése (The termination Of 
obligation with a tranaction). In: Magyar Magánjog (Hungarian civil law), vol. 
I l l : Law of obligations. General Part. Ed. — in-chief: Károly Szladits. Budapest, 
1941. Grill Károly Könyvkiadó Vállalata. 
is László Asztalos: Polgári jog I. Általános rész. Személyek. (Civil law I, 
General part II. Persons). Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982. p. 69. Lajos Tamás: 
Magyar polgári jog. Általános rész (Hungarian civil law. General part). Tankönyv-
kiadó. Budapest, 1981, p. 96. Miklós Világhy: Ideiglenes tananyag a polgári jog 
általános részéből (Provisional subject-matter of instruction from the general part 
of civil law). Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest, 1977. p. 198. 
is Act. IV of 1959, amended by Act. IV of 1977. 
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these cases the rescission is of sanction character. From among the cases 
belonging here particularly the right of rescission is important, ensured 
particularly owing to the default or the faulty fulfilment of the obligor. The 
following do, however, not fall within the scope of the present subject as 
further bases of rescission: the refusal of fulfilling a contract by the obligor, 
similarly the impossibility of fulfilling a service. 
The cases to be drawn under the second group are those, in which the 
violation of the contract by the obligor is no condition of exercising the 
right of rescission by the orderer. (Such are the contracts of confidential or 
gratuitous character in the circle of nationals, delivery contracts and 
contracts for work, labour and materials at the transactions of economic 
units, the change of official prices).20 In these cases — as well as in case 
of rescission because of the retroactivity of a legal rule (Civil Code, Art.226 
— the exercise of the right of rescission falls within the scope of personal, 
deliberation. But the protection of the lawful interest of the other party is 
an important point of view, as well. To the exercise of the right of 
rescission, belonging to these two groups, the existence of different 
conditions is needed, resp. different legal effects are connected with the 
different cases of rescission. 
In the present economic system in Hungary, the carriers of the interest 
of people's economy are enterprises. The directing organs — even if not 
without any contradiction have lost the right of deciding the everyday 
economic questions. 
Prior to building it in the Civil Code amended, the order on delivery 
contracts made an expressed duty of the orderer (vendee) to recognize the 
requirements properly and to provide for the corresponding measures. This 
duty is now to be seen clearly from Art. 1. sec. 1, Art. 3, sec. 2, Art. 4. 
sec. 1, Art. 31, sec. 2 and Art. 43, sec. 2. of Civil Code amended, where the 
points in quiestion are: the aim of the Act, the requirement of the planned, 
proportionate development of people's economy, the duties of the state-owned 
enterprises and co-operatives. These should, namely, perform their tasks on 
the basis of aims of »the national economic plan, in the interest of satisfying 
the social requirements. 
The orderer (vendee) is burdened by the duty, to follow with attention 
the requirements, not only prior to concluding the contract but in the whole 
course of the existance of the contract. It was therefore made a task and 
right of the orderer (vendee) to decide, which contract proved to be 
superfluous. 
According to the rules of law on the subject therefore, if the actual 
formation of the requirement cannot be measured properly at concluding the 
contract, or if after concluding the contract the requirement changes in a 
considerable degree, the orderer (vendee) may "at any time" use his right 
of rescission because every further outgivings for implementing the contract 
on the ordered product, which however proved to be superfluous in the 
meantime, would contravene the general interests of people's economy. 
The ensurance of this right corresponds to the practical requirements. 
There may namely occur some cases, too, when the needs were already 
missing át concluding the contract and nevertheless, the conclusion of the 
20 Gyula Eörsi: Kötelmi jog általános rész (Law of obligations. General part). 
Tankönyvkiadó. Budapest, 1979, p. 128. 
contract took place, owing to the carelessness of the orderer.. The orderer 
may recede from the contract in this case, as well, because it is not prescribed 
in the legal rule that this right can only. be exercised in case of a demand, 
ceasing to be later. . 
The orderer's rescission is unhindered, as well, if he anyway admits the 
existence of the demand but he can better serve his "own" interests by using 
his material means in another field. It looks to me that, this time, the right 
of rescission is directed toward an aim incompatible with the social 
destination of the right, realizing with this the abuse of rights, regulated in 
Art. 5 of the Civil Code. But in the new system of the direction of economy, 
the task of enterprises is to strive for a legitimate activity, as remunerative 
as possible. If the orderer can only achieve this by exercising the authorized 
right of rescission, the right of rescission cannot be contested. Otherwise, in 
the case, too, the liability for all damages is an effective factor against using 
rescission. . „ ; 
The orderers of delivery contract and those of work, labour and 
materials have the right of free rescission. The regulation, of the two 
contracts, partly as compared with the proceedings of rescission. According 
to Art. 35. sec. 1 of the order in council No. 44/1967 (XI. 5.) Korm 
(implementing order) on the contract for work, labour and materials, "the 
orderer may at any time recede from the contract but he obliged to pay 
damages for. the contractor." 
The general right of rescission of the orderer was originally regulated by 
Art. 23 of tthe order in council No.10/1966 (11.14) Korm. on the delivery 
contract, in the following way : 
"(1) The orderer may rescind a contract before the term of 
accomplishment; he is, however, obliged to compensate the contractor for 
the expenses incurred. The fundemental conditions of delivery may dispose 
this in a different way, as well. 
(2) If the rescission is attributable to the blamable conduct of one of the 
parties, the legal consequences of the breach of a contract ensue." 
This regulation did not serve either the practical or the theoritical 
requirements. There were several objections against it: 
(a) it limited the right of rescission unjustifiedly to the period not 
exceeding the term of fulfilment in the scope of delivery contracts; 
(b) in case of rescission it only prescribed the refunding of expensen lo 
the debit of the orderer, presumably with the intention of. dividing risk; 
(c) in spite of some economic-political conceptions, sec.2, declared the 
lawful rescission, written in sec. 1, to be under certain conditions an illegal 
conduct and, in these cases, fastened to these the legal consequences of the 
violation of a contract; 
(d) but it was not justified with that the regulation should be different 
for delivery contracts and for those for work, labour and materials. 
The amendment was made necessary by these circumstances and 
contained in order in council No. 3/1970 (II. 3.) Korm., as follows: 
"The orderer may rescind a contract at any time, he is however obliged 
to compensate for the damage of the contractor" (Art. 23.). 
Then this became the text of the Civil Code amended, in connection 
with the general right of rescission of the orderer of delivery contract and 
of the contract for work, labour and materials (Art. 381. sec. 1, Art. 395. 
sec. 1). This full liability for damages means, in fact, a compensation because 
23 353 
— in lack of unlawfulness — the point in question is not a formation of 
liability. 
The right of rescission and the legal consequences, ensuing in case of 
exercising this, are regulated in the rule of law with cogent provisions (cf. 
Civil Code, Art. 386, sec. 1, and Art. 401, as well as order in council No. 
7/1978. (II. 1.) Mt, concerning the implementation of chapters XXXIV and 
XXXV of Civil Code, on the delivery contracts and those for labour and 
materials of economic organizations", Art. 113, sec. 1). At concluding the 
contract, the orderer can therefore not renounce the discission validly, resp. 
if the parties mutually settled a different legal consequence, this agreement 
is invalid. 
According to order in council No. 10/1966 (11.14) Korm., the fundamental 
conditions of delivery could provide on Art. 23, sec. 1, in a different way, 
too. This rule was not taken over by order in council No. 2/1970 (II.3.) Korm., 
either. This was a very important change because the prevalence of the right 
of rescission could be prevented concerning any product by the fundamental 
conditions of delivery. At the same time, the amendment of Civil Code, 
with character of rule of law, terminated the system of fundamental 
conditons, at least in its earlier form. 
The orders regulating the general right of rescission of the orderer 
(vendee) do not contain any provision for formal requirements for the 
declaration of rescission. Just therefore, here the general rule of ius in 
pérsonam (law of obligations) is to be applied. According to Art. 320, sec. 1 
of Civil Code: "He who is entitled — owing to a contract or a rule — to 
rescission, exercises his right with a declaration, addressed to the other party. 
Rescission dissolves the contract." 
As to the formal requisites of declaration, Art. 218, sec. 3 provides as 
follows: "If the validity of a contract is connected by a rule of law or the 
agreement of parties with a prescribed form, the termination or dissoution 
of a contract concluded in such a form is also only valid in this prescribed 
form." The same section recognizes — in case of the existence of agreeing 
wills — also the validity of the existence of the actual dissolution or 
termination, brought into being by an indicative conduct. 
The relevant rules do not speak of the formal requisites of rescission. 
It is questionable whether it can be made orally or with an indicative 
conduct. From the provisions of the above-mentioned rule of law> the 
conclusion can be drawn that the descission, dissolving a contract unilaterally, 
requires the use of written records, at least in the form as it is used at 
concluding contracts.21 The cause of that the form of declaring rescission is 
no problem of the present-day practice, is that the economic units generally 
inform one another of their intentions, as a rule, in writing. 
It is not determined in any rule of law, either, What the declaration of 
descission should contain. Just therefore, such' a declaration is also to be 
considered as suitable which does not specify exactly the title of descision but 
the will of concluding person can be concluded from it. To the interpretation 
Art. 207, sec. 1 of Civil Code is to be applied, that is to say, the presumable 
wish of the declaring person; and taking into consideration the conditions of 
the case, as well, the generally accepted meaning. of words will be decisive. 
. 21 The Commentary on civil code (A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata, vol. 
II) Közgazdasági és Jogi könyvkiadó. Budapést, 1981, pp. 1471-1474, 1807, 1808, Í875, 
1876, does not take stand concerning formal requirements. 
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. The lawsuits, connected with rescission, get before a judge, at any rate, 
riot alway under this title. In different litigious matters — in subjects of 
compensation, guarantee, purchase price, enterpreneurial remuneration, resp. 
penalty for non-performance — rescission as a frequent eliciting cause of the 
litigation, plays a role. The starting point in deciding these lawsuits is 
generally whether the applied title of rescission is legal. 
It is not indifferent to either of the parties, upon what grounds the 
authorized person wants to have the contract judicially set aside. Namely, if 
he exercises his general right to rescind the contract, he should pay 
condemnation; and if he recedes from the contract. owing to that the other 
party violated it, then this pays a penalty for non-performing the contract 
and also compensation if the damage is higher than the penalty. Therefore, 
the orderer ought to inform the contractor (entérpreneur) in his declaration 
of rescission, about the title of his terminating the contract. Nonetheless, it 
often occurs that the orderer does not make known exactly the title of his 
rescission. For the sake of unifying the judicial practice, the Economic 
College of the Supreme Court issued its ruling (hereinafter called: GK 16).22 
According to this, if the orderer rescinds the contract, he should give the 
cause of rescission in his declaration given to the other party, resp. he should 
say the title of rescission, as well. In want of which — or if the particular 
title of rescission does not follow clearly from the conditions of the case — 
the declaration of rescission should be considered as valid on the basis of the 
general right of the orderer to rescind a contract. The orderer may give the 
particular title of rescission later on, as well, if it is based on a breach of the 
contract. The orderer may also transform later on his rescission, exercised 
owing to a breach of the contract, into a rescission exercised upon the general 
title. According to the generally, accepted standpoint, however, in the 
proceedings of appeal, the title of descision cannot be changed any more. 
The proceedings of appeal are the continuations of preceedings of first 
instance on another level. Nevertheless, certain elements of the case are 
conserved by finishing the proceedings of first instance. It is, therefore, not 
allowed tö vindicate a right which should have been decided in mérito in the 
proceedings on the first instance. I : 
It belongs to the investigation into the title of rescission the statement of 
the above-mentioned ruling, as well, that "if there was no room for rescission 
on the basis of the title, given in the declaration of rescission, and the party 
issuing this declaration does not change the title, the court of law cannot 
establish the lawfulness of decision under the pretext of a different ground." 
In the course of-the proceedings, one of the parties usually contests the 
legality of decision. In the case if the orderer-applies his general right of 
rescission, this does not mean any problem because rescission on this basis is 
always lawful. In case of a "rescission on the basis, of violating the contract 
however, if it is Contested, the = court should establish whether the conditions, 
determined in the rule of law, do or do not exist, and it should decide, 
22 Collection "Polgári, Gazdasági és Munkaügyi Elvi Határozatok" (Civil, 
Economic and Labour Laws Decision of Principle), Büdapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, pp. 443-445. Its modified variation is to be found in the publication 
"Polgári és gazdasági elvi határozatok a Magyar Népköztársaság Legfelsőbb Bíró-
ságának irányelvei, elvi döntései és állásfoglalásai" (Directives, Decisions and 
Rulings of the Supreme Court of the Hungarian People's Republic, Civil and 
Economic Affairs). Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Büdapest, 1980. pp. 408-410. 
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depending: upon this, about the lawfulness of rescission. If the . court , of law 
establishes the illegality of the descision of sanction-character, the orderer is 
entitled to exercise the right of general rescission "at any time" — as it is 
named by the above-mentioned ruling No. GK. 16. 
• The orderer may rescind a contract not only before the term of 
fulfilment but after its resultless expiration, as well. In case of default of the 
obligor, therefore, the orderer may choose between two titles of rescission, 
too. He may use his right of general rescission or, in case of vanishing of 
his interest, he may base his right of rescission on the default of the obligor. 
This rule is most considerable1 in the cases in which the proof of ceasing of 
his interest hits agàins difficulties, though in case of violating the contract 
this%is a -condition of rescission. The orderer, for lack of needs, wants by all 
means to get rid of the contract, at any rate without paying for this. It is 
questionable, why is it only possible to rescind the contract in case of the 
violation of the contract by the obligor only after proving the ceasing of 
the interest, while, otherwise, this action does not need any motivation. 
. In connection with the general right of rescission, it is also debated 
whether it may be realized without any restriction. It is namely not made 
depend by the rule of law either on time or on the occurrence of definite 
conditions. If it can be exercised at any time till the termination of the 
contract, whether we would clear then the way for thé arbitrariness of the 
órderer, allowing his rescission till the" payment of remuneration, as he can 
maintain the contract till the date corresponding to him by retaining his 
recompense. 
According to Pál Boytha, the orderer can set aside the contract validly 
even after the happening of notifying the completion, delivery or act of 
transferring. He "motivates his standpoint with that the nearer the contract 
gets 'to its predestined termination the higher the sum of compensation will 
bé and the amount approaches more and more the value of the subject of the 
contract what is a suitable retaining force against the unjustified exercising 
of the right of rescission.23 
The orderer is: expected latest at the date of taking over the ware, to be 
in clear with if there is a solvent demand, respectively whether the contract 
is superfluous to him. Thus, according to the right standpoint, the orderer is 
free to exercise his right of rescission till the fulfilment of delivery. 
" This practical expediency is determined by ruling No. GK 16, as well. In 
the sense of this, the orderer may exercise the right of general rescission as 
long as the fulfilment has nöt taken place. 
This also applies to" the case where the fulfilment had already happened 
before the term of fulfilment terminated (e.g. preliminary delivery was 
accepted by the orderer). 
This ruling has highly promoted thé unification of judicial practice but it 
would be a better solution to make the text of the rule of law unambiguous. 
The Givil Code amended has similarly had no provision in this respect. We 
do not think, however, probable that it wanted to prolong the right of 
recission even to the period after the fulfilment of delivery. 
. In thè course , of lawsuits, howevér, more and more trouble was caused in 
the .domain of jurisprudence, as well, by the recurring debate about the 
23 Pál Boytha: A megrendelőt illető bármikori elállási jog (General right of 
rescission "at any time", being due to the orderer. Döntőbíráskodás, 1971, No. 1. 
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question, when the contract should be considered as fulfilled. Ruling No. GH 
.32 of the Economic College of the. Supreme Court approaches the problem 
from its practical side. It speaks, instead of the expression "fulfilment", 
applied in ruling No. GK 16,. "about the happening of delivery and taking 
over of goods. It modifies ruling No. GK. 16 in . the way that the orderer may 
exercise his general right ("at any .time"),;;as . well :as. that based, on the 
termination of his interest as a result of the delay, as-long as delivery and 
taking over have not ta:ken place. With delivery, He gave namely expression 
to that he needed the thing. The ruling emphasizes, as well, that he orderer, 
alone on the basis of his duty of. co-operation, - only takes the thing into 
responsible custody, without losing his right, of rescission.24 
A similarly animated discussion was provoked; in connection with the 
mentioned contracts by. the : long since known rule that the. contract is 
terminated by the rescission with the effect ex tunc. 
It is expounded by György Boytha that once the main characteristics of 
these contractual connactions is the objective reality, preventing the 
cancellation of the contract with retroactive effect.25 In his opinion, owing to 
the circumstances, facts, taking placé after, the conclusion of the contract, a 
long line of irreversible legal effects were produced which cannot be declared 
as null and void by the. declaration. of decission; In these cases; therefore, 
the produced legal connections, legal relations continue remaining existent, 
independently of cancelling the contract, though the general legal consequence 
of rescission was the in integrum v restitution. But even in the case to be 
restituted, a further problem is: meant by the .circumstance that, if the 
contractual connection becomes dissolved by the delivery of the declaration 
resp. by the communication of the déclaration of réscission with, immediate 
retroactive effect, then what the basis of in .integrum, restitutio, resp. the 
connection between the earlier contracting parties will be in the time of thé 
efforts for restituting the original state. 
György Boytha's final conclusion was that after rescission the contract 
is not broken, only modified, it is focussed on another, delivery. 
Let us take the simpler fall when the original staté can be restored. 
At solving the question, we should set out from that, between the 
parties, a legal connection of course remains after rescission, as well, the aim 
of which is no more to fulfil the contract but the possible implementation 
of the in integrum restitutio. Just therefore, after rescission we cannot speak, 
any more, about a contract, in a modified form, éither. 
At exercising the right of general rescission of the orderer; ^therefore, the 
delivery contract, as well as the contract for work, labour and materials are 
dissolved and further on, the basis of the legal connection between the 
parties is the duty of compensàtion, burdening the contractor resp. 
enterpreneur; resp. the duty of mitigating the damages, with the fulfilling 
of which duty, the parties promote the restitution: of the original state, at 
least in the domain of value relations.20 ; 
24 Ruling No. GK 32, In: Bírósági Határozatok, 1983, No. 5, pp. 368-369. 
25 György Boytha: Az elállás intézménye jogunkban (The legal institution of 
rescission in our law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1967, No. 7. ' 
26 László Kecskés deals in his article: A szerződéstől elálló fél restitúciós és 
kártérítési kötelezettségének megítélése (Adjucation of the duty of restitution and 
compensation of the party rescinding the conract) with the mutual relation 
between restitution and compénsation, taking place in connection with rescission. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1978. No. 11, pp. 682-689; ~ • - ' . - -••-... -
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The legal consequence of rescission is that the orderer is obliged to pay 
the damage of the contractor resp. enterpreneur. The rule of law does not 
allow any exception of this provision. It namely protects the interests of the 
obligor against the hasty acts of the orderer. The protection has increased by 
that the damage should be recompensed to full extent. Thus, at calculaging 
the extent of compensation, in the sense of Art. 353, sec. 4 of Civil Code, we 
should take into consideration the deteriation in value of the assets of the 
damaged person and the pecuniary advantage being in arrears, including the 
expenses of recompensation, as well, which are necessary to reducing or 
eliminating the financial or non-financial- losses of the damaged person. The 
nonfinancial damage, revived by the Civil Code amended can come in 
question in case of juristic përsons if the rescission harmfully influences the 
participation of the obligor in the economic turnover. This hardly occurs in 
connection with the general rescission but is theoritically not excluded. 
The Act does not attach any legal consequence to rescission, apart from 
the obligation of compensation. Nevertheless, it often occurs that the 
contractor wishes to vindicate penalty for nonperformance against the 
orderer. We should clear the question, therefore, whether the duty of paying 
non-performance penalty falls upon'the orderer. 
We should start from that the payment of penalty is connected with the 
breách of contract; not exculpated. The general rescission is, however, not to 
be classified among the cases, of the violations of contracts because the 
legislator speaks of it not in the Chapter of "Violation of contracts" but in 
thát of "Modification : and termination of contracts." Moreover, rescission 
cannot be considered as blameable or reproachable because it is not 
connected with any condition, its exercising "át any time" is permitted by a 
rule .of law. It is. indifferent, therefore, by what motives the doer felt moved 
to rescind, the contract : owing to a: change in his needs, or only because he 
previously improperly assessed them. That is; to say, in this case he should 
not pay any penalty. 
István Zsemberi takes the opposite standpoint. He regards rescission as 
one of the cases of terminating a contract. Therefore, in his opinion, the 
obligation of paying penalty for non-performance charges the orderer in the 
same way as the obligation of compensation. In his. view, namely, "this 
interpretation is required by the struggle against the irresponsible arid 
overhasty conclusion of . contracts, as well, which loosen the contracting 
discipline and disturb the planned course of people's economy."28 We cannot 
accept this standpoint from economic point of view because this part is 
played satiffactorily by the obligation of compensation, as well, so much the 
more because from this there is no exemption. The enterprise would not pay 
more amount even if a culpable violation of a contract were ascertained 
because the penalty for non-performance is always included in the amount of 
the compensation to be paid. 
The situation is formed in a different way if the contracting parties 
agree about that in case of rescission of the orderer he pays a non-
27 The same is the standpoint of Gyula Eörsi: A reális teljesítés elve a gazdaság-
irányítás új rendszerében (The principle of real fulfilment in the new system of 
economic direction): Jogtudományi Közlöny, i.968, Nos.- 7-8. pp. 341-360. 
a» István Zsembery: A mezőgazdasági termelőszövetkezetek árukapcsolatainak 
néhány kérdéséről (On . some .questions of the tie-up sale of agricultural co-
operatives). Magyar Jog, 1970. No. 4. 
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performance penalty of definite extent. Taking into consideration that the 
non-performance penalty is expressly a sanction of the violation of a contract, 
the matter of question is, in fact, not a penalty for non-performance but a 
forfeat. The use of this permitted by Art. 320, sec.. 2 of Civil Code. 
Nonetheless, in the present-day legal arrangement, in case of delivery 
contracts and those for . work, labour and materials, no forfeat can be 
stipulated validly but the damage, induced at the date of rescission, should 
fully be compensated. The economic organisation can, namely — as referred 
to above — not deviate from the provisions concerning the contracts of 
delivery and of work, labour and materials, without an expressed permit. 
But in this case, the proved full and natural damage of the obligor should 
be compensated. It is hardly possible to decide reassuringly, how much this 
restriction is justified. 
In the following we shall investigate into how the orderer may use his 
general right of rescission if a breach of contract was committed. This is 
primarily considerable because of the conditions of rescission to be applied 
and of legal consequences. 
Among the cases of violations of contracts, that are essential from the 
point of view of the subject, we should also separate the delay of the obligor, 
resp. the faulty fulfilment. The rescission, based on the delay of the obligor 
can only be considered as legal if the orderer proves that the fulfilment 
became without any interest for him because of the delay. If often occurs 
that the orderer cannot prove this precondition but — for lack of needs — 
he nevertheless wants to get rid of the contract, becoming superfluous. In 
this case, the statisfaction of opposite requirements raises a complicated 
problem because the orderer is burdened by the obligation of a full 
compensation, the deliverer (enterpreneur) committed, on the other hand, 
possibly the culpable violation of a contract, owing to which he would be 
obliged to pay penalty for non-performance. Is it equitable in such a case 
that the orderer should pay compensation? It is not equitable, nevertheless, 
this is lawful. In this case, from among the claims colliding with one another, 
the claim of the obligor seems to be stronger. We are facing the problem 
returning later on, too, that the rules of violation being able to enforce the 
principle of real fulfilling in the old form, are in contradiction to the general 
right of rescission, regulated on the basis of new conception. 
The situation is even more complicated in case of a defective fulfilment. 
In this case, the orderer exercises his general right of rescission, as a rulé, 
in the case if he had only the possibility to ask for repairs or exchange 
because to rescission he had to prove the termination of interest. It became 
debated whether the delivery of a defective product is qualified as such a 
fulfilment which — according to the earlier propounded standpoint — 
prevents the enforcement of any right of rescission as the contractor 
(enterpreneur) took over the obligation in the contract to deliver an 
undamaged product (work). In the opinion of Pál Boytha, in case of a 
defective fulfilment, the obligor owes — on the basis of a legal guarantee or 
undertaken indemnity — a further obligation in order to fulfil the contract 
completely. Therefore, till the elimination of the defect, the contract remains 
valid, even if the taking over and payment by the orderer took already 
place earlier. With regard to this, there is nothing to prevent legally that the 
orderer may set aside a contract at any time, which has remained — owing 
to the defective fulfilment — further, on valid, by exercising his general right 
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of rescinding a contract at any time.29 In our opinion, the fulfilment of a 
contract with a defective thing, which is nevertheless suitable for proper use, 
is such a fulfilment, the taking place of which no more enables the use of 
the general right of rescission "at any time."30 Then the orderer can only 
rescind the contract in the form of a sanction of its violation. But here hé 
again impacts the problem that he should verify to this the termination of 
his interest in the contract. 
The contract is terminated by the lawfully exercised rescission with 
retroactive effect. Before the modification of Civil Code, there was no legal 
possibility to rescind a contract in part. It occures, nevertheless, that the 
orderer wanted to use his right of rescission concerning only one part of the 
contract — generally the part that wás not fulfilled, as yet. In this question, 
we see different standpoints though the legality of rescission has generally 
not been challenged. The opinions have rather been different in the field of 
solution. There was an opinion, according to which: if the delivery is 
divisible then a partial rescission may also occur. This problem was 
terminated by the Civil Code amended in respect of the contracts of delivery N 
and those for work, labour and materials. In the sense of Art. 381, resp. \ 
Art. 395, sec. 2, if the situation before concluding the contract cannot be 
restored or if it is motivated by a people's economic interest or by another 
interest which is worthy of a particular appreciation: the court of law may 
— in case of the discission of the orderer, upon the petition of either of the 
parties — terminate the contract for the future. * In such cases, too, the 
orderer is obliged to compensate the contractor for his damage. 
The amendment therefore rightly uphold the standpoint that the orderer 
is due to a partial rescission, as well, because this similarly motivated by 
people's economic point of view as the full rescission is. 
The practice of judicature has generally recognized the right of a partial 
rescission of the orderer earlier, as well. 
There was no uniform practice of judicature in respectc of what wi th 
certain things should happen, thus with the products made or unf in ished 
till the rescission, wi th the basic materials laid up, which cannot be used by 
the contractor for another purpose and it is not possible making use of them. 
The courts of l aw have obliged the orderer more than once to take over 
these products, materials. 
In these cases, the orderers disputed of right their obligation of taking 
over. It follows of the in integrum restitutio that the orderer cannot be 
obliged to take over the rest-delivery. All the same, in extreme cases, wher<? 
the contractor (enterpreneur) reassuringly proves that every possibility to 
process the material for another purpose and to dispose of it was-frustrated, 
then the orderer will yet be obliged, to "take over" the thing made or 
essentially made, as well. This means that, the orderer makes an effort to 
get rid of the given product in vain, he cannot — though he were entitled 
to '— do this. The meeting of the council-presidents of the Supreme Court 
• 29 Pál Boytha: A megrendelőt bármikor megillető elállási jog (The right of 
rescission,'due to the .orderer at any time). DöntőbíráskódásJ 1971, Nö. 1.r 
, • 30 Tóthné • Eszter Fábián: A szerződések teljesítésének alapkérdései a szocialista 
gazdaságirányítású rendszerekben (Basic principles of fulfilling the contracts in 
the. systems of socialist economic direction). Szeged, 1982 (Manuscript), p. 206. 
The same standpoint was accepted Ruling No. GK 16, amended by Ruling No. GK 32 
3i GKT 1/1982. Bírósági Határozatok, 1982. No.. 6, p. 453. 
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(No. GKT 1/1982) took a stand on this question.31 This establishes that the 
decision on the subject of utilizing the superfluous product is independent of 
the fact, in the sphere of interest of which party the cause of modifying or 
terminating the conctract arose or which party is responsible for it. These 
circumstances are, however, not indifferent in deciding on the question, 
which party should bear the costs, damages connected with the utilization. 
It is not a less problem, how to establish the amount of damages, 
particularly if the contractor (enterpreneur) has not yet solved the marketing 
of products and materials left behind with him, till the rendition of the 
judgement. We meet with a solution that the contractor (enterpreneur) 
enforced his claim to a compensation in details, corresponding to marketing. 
And a practice also began to develop which wanted to apply in this case the 
rule of Civil Code concerning the general condemnation. 
The many kinds of the legally ensured ius resistendi of the orderers of 
delivery contracts and of those for work, labour and materials correspond to 
the economic requirements, in spite of the above-mentioned minor 
inconsequences. We could mention, as yet, that the Civil Code amended also 
speaks about the right of rescission "át any* time", in the same way as the 
earlier rules, specified by the ruling of the Economic College of the 
Supreme Court concerning the general right of rescission extending till the 
implementation of handing and taking over the thing or work. It would be 
impossible, both theoretically and practically, to loosen the "binding force" 
of the contract so much that somebody may rescind a contract even after 
fulfilment. 
It is not satisfactorily cleared, as yet, what the mutual relation of the 
different kinds of rescission, the sequence of their applicability, the way of 
exercising more than one sort of rescission jointly, the kind of the obligation 
of compensation in case of exercising the general right of rescission are. This 
right is ensured by the rules of law primarily in case of the termination of, 
or the change in, the needs in the meantime, because the orderer is in respect 
of the eliciting cause generally not culpable. There arose, therefore, such an 
opinion that "it would be good to endeavour such a solution that in so far 
as the rescission cannot be attributed to the imputable conduct of either of 
the parties, the damage of the contractor should not be compensated finally 
by the orderer but — after developing the system of the social distribution 
of damages — in the last resort by the insurance institute or budget".32 In 
this case, we would return to that this is a rescission based on a culpable 
conduct but it would not present itself, after all, in the form of violating a 
contract. In order to decide, what be righter, an extensive fact-finding 
investigation would be necessary. The fact-finding investigation, performed 
by courts of law, has shown that there are no frequent legal disputes in 
connection with the above-mentioned rescission. (There were all in all about 6 
to 8 such disputes per country during the investigated one and a half years). 
We cannot know, however, how many debates may have occurred 
independently from judicial proceeding because the orderer need not appeal 
to a court in order to enforce his right. At any rate, this only occurs — 
within the framework of the ordinary economy — really only is cases if the 
needs terminate, resp. the orderer is able to utilize the material means at his 
disposal to better advantage. 
32 pál, Boytha: Elállás a szállítási szerződés teljesítési határideje előtt (Rescission 
before the term of fulfilment of the delivery contract). Döntőbíráskodás, 1979, No. 11. 
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A considerablé part of questions issues from that the rules of the 
violation of contracts generally strive to enforce the fulfilment, while the 
general right of rescission serves just contrary aims. 
In our iura in personam (law of obligations), the prevalence of the 
fulfilment in nature is a peculiar principle. But in the scope of the delivery 
contracts and of those for work, labour and materials this principle develops 
in contrast to the general principle. 
The orders regulating the contract of delivery and those for work, 
labour and materials ensure a one-sided right of rescission to the orderer. 
At thé majority of his contracts, provided with a name, it is not possible to 
terminate thé labour relations one-sidedly. At the contracts mentioned, it 
depends on the orderer alone as on the carrier of he solvent demand, whether 
the actual fulfilment takes its turn. If he wants-it, the obligor cannot help 
but fulfil even today-, he cannot commute his obligation for paying money. 
Although under changed condition, it is an unchanged principle that the 
fundamental aimi of the socialist economic order is to satisfy the needs, the 
way to which is planned economy and its means are, as to the legal form of 
connections between the economic units, contracts. 
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